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Abstract
Much has been said about the need for improving the current definitions of scien-
tific authorship, but an aspect that is often overlooked is how to formulate and com-
municate these definitions to ensure that they are comprehensible and useful for 
researchers, notably researchers active in international research consortia. In light 
of a rapid increase in international collaborations within natural sciences, this arti-
cle uses authorship of this branch of sciences as an example and provides sugges-
tions to improve the comprehensibility of the definitions of authorship in natural 
sciences. It assesses whether the definition of authorship provided by the European 
Code of Conduct for Research Integrity can deal with current issues and problems 
of scientific authorship. Notably, problems that are experienced in project groups 
with researchers coming from multiple countries. Using theories developed by Jür-
gen Habermas and Robert Merton, a normative framework is developed to articulate 
ethical authorship in natural sciences. Accordingly, enriching the current definition 
of authorship with normative elements and using discipline-specific metaphors to 
communicate them are introduced as possible ways of improving the comprehen-
sibility of the definition of authorship in international environments. Finally, this 
article provides a proposal to be considered in the future revisions of the European 
Code of Conduct for Research Integrity.
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Introduction
Scientific authorship, as “the traditional vehicle of scientific communication”, 
faces an increase in the number and range of actors which it links (Gibbons et al. 
1994, p. 34). This has resulted in an increase in the average number of authors per 
paper, the diversity of expertise involved in the writing of a paper and the fields 
and the types of organizations from which the authors originate. Consequently, 
the geographical distribution of these authors is also broadened (Gibbons et  al. 
1994). While recognizing these trends, this paper will focus on the growth of col-
laborations between co-authors coming from various countries (hereafter called 
international co-authors) and the challenges involved in the communication of the 
norms of authorship in these collaborations.
A key concern in communicating the norms of authorship is the promotion 
of a definition of authorship in academic environments. Often times, this defini-
tion is mentioned in institutional or international Codes Of Conduct (COCs) that 
provide a general description of what determines who an author is. These codes 
are the official tools in laying out professional responsibilities and explaining the 
limits of acceptability in academia (Davis 1999). In this article, the communica-
tion of results according to the prescriptions of COC is called good authorship. 
Ethical authorship, however, as will be described thoroughly, is beyond following 
prescriptions and concerns authors’ motivations for publishing.
As international co-authorships grow, defining scientific authorship in COCs 
becomes a complicated matter (LaFollette 1992; Gibbons et  al. 1994; Cronin 
et al. 2003; Wagner 2006; Anderson et al. 2011; Anand 2015). For instance, his-
torical and regional differences in the meaning and implications of the practice of 
authorship (Long 2001), language differences, cultural misunderstandings, man-
agement issues, differences in assumptions, expectations, roles and work styles 
indicate that in many instances, international co-authors are not always on the 
same page (Anderson 2010). Furthermore, due to differences in constituents of 
authorship in different countries and disciplines (Vasconcelos et al. 2014), vari-
ations in organization and management of research practices, research activities 
across academic, business and government sectors (Anderson 2010), or regula-
tory and legal differences (Bohnhorst et al. 2010), what is acceptable in one coun-
try might be considered problematic or even regarded as misconduct in another 
country. For example, in some countries, senior researchers may take credit for 
work done by junior colleagues, or in other cases, researchers may use author-
ship as a quid pro quo. In circumstances where some collaborators are more in 
need of publications, authorship credit might be distributed generously (or overly 
generously) to them with the expectation to receive similar favors in the future 
(Anderson et al. 2011).
Careful consideration of these issues is warranted by the rise of international 
co-authorships in recent years. In terms of the areas where this growth is more 
pronounced, data published by the U.S. National Science Board in 2018 are illu-
minating. Between 2006 and 2016, internationally co-authored publications grew 
from 16.7 to 21.7% of all co-authored publications worldwide. In particular, the 
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natural sciences, notably astronomy with 54%, followed by geosciences, math-
ematics, biological sciences, mathematics, physics, and chemistry (all above the 
average of 24.2%), have the highest rates of international collaborations (National 
Science Board 2018). What is remarkable about this trend is that the growth in 
international co-authorships within these disciplines is independent of the pres-
ence of different authorship norms such as authors order, contribution types 
(Smith and Master 2017) and the average number of authors per publication 
(Abramo and D’Angelo 2015).
In light of the increasing incidence of international co-authorships in the natural 
sciences and the difficulties involved in defining and communicating good author-
ship, this paper aims to enrich definitions of authorship, so that they are less likely 
to cause misinterpretation among international co-authors in the natural sciences. It 
is worth mentioning that by focusing on the natural sciences, this article is neither 
indicating importance nor primacy of this branch of science over others. This is a 
pragmatic choice given that in this branch of sciences, international collaborations 
are growing more rapidly compared to other areas.
This paper is structured in the following way: it will begin by detailing some 
practical difficulties of communicating a clear definition of authorship to interna-
tional co-authors via COCs. Using an internationally accepted code of conduct, it 
assesses how the provided definition responds to challenges faced by international 
groups. With this in mind, the normative foundations of the concept of authorship in 
the natural sciences will be identified. This will help to develop a theoretical frame-
work to explain what ethical authorship in the natural sciences entails. The third 
part focuses on the communication of the suggested framework and its normative 
elements and provides an example that can be used to explain ethical authorship in 
international environments. Finally, this article concludes that the suggested frame-
work combined with its effective communication might enhance the usefulness of 
the definition of authorship and make it less vulnerable to misinterpretation.
Challenges Involved in the Communication of the Norms of Good Authorship 
via COCs
As mentioned in the introduction, academic COCs often entail a definition that 
explains the boundaries of good authorship and requires the compliance of scien-
tists. Besides complexities involved in the formulation of a definition of authorship 
which is unequivocal for scientists worldwide, the normative authority and useful-
ness of COCs are often questioned as well. For instance, it is argued that one fun-
damental issue with communicating norms via COCs is that the scientists often see 
COCs as an “external, superimposed, artificial and unrealistic” document that pro-
vides formalistic frameworks, with poor relevance to daily practices (Consoli 2008, 
p. 240).
On the one hand, definitions of scientific authorship are complicated to articulate 
(Biagioli and Galison 2003), as what constitutes authorship differ per period and 
discourse (Foucault 1979), and, given the growth of international co-authorships, 
in practice, they imply different meanings for authors from other countries. On the 
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other hand, instruments which do attempt to communicate such definitions (i.e. 
COCs) are often seen as containing too many abstract and formal elements to be 
practically useful, and too general for and external to daily practices (Forsberg et al. 
2018).
As such, to explain the difficulties of formulation and communication of a defini-
tion of authorship that will be comprehensible to international co-authors, analyzing 
one of the current definitions of authorship will be helpful here. For that purpose, 
due to its international character and broad application, the European Code of Con-
duct for Research Integrity (ECCRI) is chosen. The publisher, All European Acad-
emies (ALLEA) consists of 59 Science Academies based in more than 40 countries 
(ALLEA 2017), and thus, this code epitomizes an internationally recognizable 
guideline that is drafted with the support and cooperation of academic institutions 
from several countries.
In its latest version published in March 2017, ECCRI mentions publication and 
dissemination as an important aspect of good research practice. Issues such as 
sequence of authorship, timely, open, transparent and accurate communication to the 
general public, acknowledgment of the important contribution of others and disclo-
sure of conflict of interests are also mentioned. More importantly, ECCRI encour-
ages authors to acknowledge that authorship is based on “a significant contribution 
to the design of the research, relevant data collection, or the analysis or interpreta-
tion of the results” (ALLEA 2017, p. 7).
In this definition, significant contribution to named activities seems to be the nec-
essary and sufficient prerequisite for/of becoming an author. Given the aforemen-
tioned growth of international collaborations, however, different interpretations of 
significant contribution are likely to exacerbate current ambiguities and cause more 
tensions. The term significant has dissimilar meanings for different contributors, and 
given the participation of international co-authors with various working cultures and 
habits, it will contribute to the misunderstanding of good authorship. For example, 
providing feedback in a short meeting that leads to a major change of direction in 
the project could be seen as a significant contribution to the project and deserving 
authorship status by some. This way of receiving authorship status might feel unwar-
ranted by other contributors who spent months conducting experiments or analyzing 
data.
Clearly, granting authorship status to those who have not contributed significantly 
to the work conveys benefit to them, but at the same time, it also reduces the appro-
priate benefit to those who actually contributed to the work and impedes a fair dis-
tribution of credit (Strange 2008). Therefore, a misunderstanding of the notion of 
significant contribution is likely to contribute to authorship abuse (Strange 2008), 
and this suggests that the notion of significant contribution alone seems to be ill-
equipped in addressing disagreements about authorship in international projects.
That said, it is also safe to assume that, due to the discrepancies in what consti-
tutes authorship in different disciplines (Larivière et al. 2016), creating imperatives 
that are both accurate and general enough to cover all the possible violations of the 
norms of authorship for all disciplines in the natural sciences would be impracti-
cal. Accurate descriptions that encompass every violation in every discipline would 
make the definition not only longer but even more perplexing and far more difficult 
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to comprehend for international co-authors. In other words, while the current defini-
tion is open-ended and subject to abuse, strengthening it by adding all the necessary 
descriptive elements is neither feasible nor non-problematic.
The developers of ECCRI too seem to be aware of these issues and have sub-
sumed publication and dissemination as one condition of good research practices, 
which together with seven other contexts are based on the fundamental principles of 
research integrity. These principles include reliability, honesty, respect, and account-
ability (see Fig. 1). ECCRI asserts that these four principles “guide researchers in 
their work as well as in their engagement with the practical, ethical and intellectual 
challenges inherent in research” (ALLEA 2017, p. 4).
This article argues that, given the specific and complex issues pertinent to author-
ship, some of these fundamental principles seem to be detached from what a robust 
definition of authorship requires. For example, the way in which the principle of 
respect is currently qualified in ECCRI [“respect for colleagues, research partici-
pants, society, ecosystems, cultural heritage and the environment” (ALLEA 2017, 
p. 4)] is likely to cause confusion among international co-authors. In particular, in 
some cultural contexts where “it may be deemed appropriate or even required to 
give authorship credit out of respect (e.g. to senior colleagues, or directors of insti-
tutes)” (Smith et al. 2014, p. 5), the notion of respect for colleagues is prone to cause 
serious problems in the context of authorship. Similarly, the principle of honesty, 
that entails “honesty in developing, undertaking, reviewing, reporting and commu-
nicating research in a transparent, fair, full and unbiased way” (ALLEA 2017, p. 
4), is likely to be affected by organizational policies and their values of openness 
and release policies. The Human Genome Project is a particularly good example of 
cooperation between scientists that, due to their affiliations, revealed “philosophi-
cal differences concerning data access and release policies” (Resnick 2007, p. 16). 
In that project, while the international consortium was committed to granting free 
access to information, Celera, a private firm that held the patent to the shotgun 
approach,1 was against the free and rapid release of DNA sequence data, to ensure 
that they could charge users a fee for results (Resnick 2007).
As analyzing ECCRI and scrutinizing its definition of authorship has shown, sci-
entists who argue that these definitions are too formal and abstract seem to have a 
Fundamental principles of 
good research in ECCRI
The eight contexts where 
principles of good 
research apply to


















Fig. 1  European code of conduct for research integrity, fundamental principles of good research and the 
contexts where those principles apply to
1 “Instead of tediously sequencing the genome one piece at a time, Venter had the idea to break apart the 
entire genome, sequence the pieces, and put the pieces back together using algorithms run on supercom-
puters to match the pieces” (Resnick 2007, p. 15).
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point, because they are difficult to apply in daily practices. One alternative solution 
to address this issue is to combine the current definition of authorship with spe-
cific normative elements that further elaborate on the notion of ethical authorship. In 
other words, instead of only basing the definition of authorship on who is/deserves 
to be an author (i.e. the one who has made a significant contribution), and remotely 
linking that definition to the fundamental principles of research integrity that are not 
always relevant to the realities of scientific authorship, this article suggests adding 
separate normative elements to this definition, which are relevant to the concept of 
ethical authorship. Doing this not only explains who is an author, but also readily 
clarifies who is an ethical author (see Fig. 2).
Using this method seems to take the stress away from defining authorship with 
the extent of contribution as the major constituent of the author function (that differs 
per period and discourse, and is particularly difficult to define in international con-
texts), to providing a more comprehensive picture that also entails the characteristics 
of an ethical author (depending on what authorship may mean in the given disci-
plines and time). Providing a definition that is enriched with these normative com-
ponents will potentially also give guidance in relation to conflicting interests/per-
spectives (e.g. on who deserves to be a co-author) on authorship in practice through 
using underlying norms of practices of authorship.
Enriching the Definition of Authorship with Normative Concepts
In light of challenges faced in providing a definition of authorship that copes with 
the complexities of modern science, this article suggests using normative elements 
in addition to (more) descriptive elements in defining authorship. As mentioned in 
the introduction, while defining authorship is complex, the presence of international 
co-authors who come from various institutions and cultural backgrounds make the 
task of explaining what authorship entails even more difficult. Therefore, through 
delineating the characteristics of an ethical author, a new method will be suggested 
to articulate the concept of authorship in ways that will make the provided defini-
tion in COCs more accessible and useful in practice. To that end, this section will 
first propose a theoretical framework to extract the normative elements involved 
in determining what ethical authorship is in the natural sciences. Later, means of 
Fundamental principles of 
good research in ECCRI
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Normave elements that explain the concept of ethical authorship
Fig. 2  Given its complexities, authorship requires different ethical principles and normative elements 
that should be directly linked to the context of publication and dissemination
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communicating those norms will be suggested. These suggestions aim to decrease 
the likelihood of making dissimilar interpretations from the definition of authorship, 
and make them more practical and relevant to international collaborations.
Normative Elements in Authorship in the Natural Sciences
Scientists working today have a myriad of options for the publication of their work. 
Since the scientific community is best placed to judge the merits of authored science 
and to provide critical remarks (Burns et al. 2003), identifying relevant norms and 
moral ideals of authorship in international peer-reviewed journals will be the focus 
of this article. To that end, discussions about the process by which nature is observed 
and claims about it communicated should be considered. To understand this process 
of observation and communication, this article will use theories developed by the 
German philosopher and sociologist, Jürgen Habermas. As will be shown shortly, 
his theories help unpack the social context in order to explain and assess the behav-
ior of involved scientists by making references to human interests and the conditions 
of objective knowledge.
What makes Habermasian theories particularly suitable for the identification of 
the conditions of being an ethical author is the fundamental normative approach he 
takes regarding knowledge, asserting that since knowledge is produced by subjects, 
its status depends on subjective conditions. He rejects the notion that the only norm 
for evaluating and criticizing scientific knowledge is the factual development of sci-
ence (Habermas 1971). In terms of the natural sciences in particular, he notes that 
while the conditions guaranteeing the objectivity of human experience (i.e. technical 
correctness) help explore reality by objectifying it, discursive verification (i.e. being 
verified in a discourse and corroborated in argument) is the necessary condition for 
reaching consensus on the claims to truth, which “reflects the intersubjective valid-
ity, on the basis of which something may be predicated of objects of experience” 
(Habermas 1973, p. 167).
Additionally, Habermas’ views on the ideal (reasonable, transparent, egalitarian) 
community seem especially relevant to the issue of authorship in science. Building 
on the work of C.S. Peirce, he considered the scientific community as an almost 
ideal speech community, as an approximation of the normative ideal of communi-
cation where (via anonymous peer review and other techniques) manipulation and 
strategic communication is abolished, hierarchies do not count and no other force is 
at work than the force of the stronger argument (Zwart 2001).
Given the role of scientific authors in communication of claims about nature, 
using Habermasian views seems to be crucial to the current context as these can 
help lay out what it means to be an ethical author based on an author’s role in pro-
ducing objective scientific knowledge. In doing that, this article uses a dichotomy 
that was suggested by Habermas in the 1970s and will develop it further using his 
later theories on the communicative act.
By linking knowledge to subjects and the qualities and conditions of the system of 
social labor, Habermas makes a distinction between reflective and productive knowl-
edge. He asserts that productive knowledge is the type that does not question its own 
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epistemological foundation and hence, lacks self-reflection. Reflective knowledge, 
on the other hand, is the result of genuine discourse and reflection (Habermas 1971). 
Thus, one necessary condition of producing objective scientific knowledge is that it 
should not be merely produced for the sake of having produced knowledge. Those 
who produce and communicate it ought to be interested in having their methods 
questioned and aim to have their results challenged and validated by other scientists. 
Putting that in the context of scientific authorship implies that being published is not 
the ultimate aim of objective scientific knowledge and producing output should only 
be a means for inviting further reflection.
Furthermore, as mentioned at the beginning of this section, Habermas believes 
that the objectivity of human perceptions or sensory experiences of nature “consists 
precisely in its being intersubjectively shared” (Habermas 1973, p. 168). As such, 
the other necessary condition for the objectivity of scientific claims (that separates 
them from happenings or state of affairs) is to achieve consensus on them (Haber-
mas 1973). This suggests that a prerequisite of producing objective science is that 
it should be shared and communicated within the scientific community, to verify 
claims through sufficient questioning and specification. In his later work, Habermas 
qualifies the conditions of this communication via the notion of genuine discourse.
In explaining the conditions of good communication, Habermas provides a dis-
tinction that clarifies what genuine discourse means. He does this through distin-
guishing communicative from purposive-rational (strategic) actions. According to 
him, understanding necessitates communication, but motivations for communication 
can either be communicative, aimed at understanding, or strategic, aimed at gaining 
power and domination (Habermas 1996). Thus, in order to be communicative rather 
than strategic, in addition to its technical correctness, objective scientific knowl-
edge should be communicated with the aim of becoming self-reflective and should 
involve genuine discourse aimed at understanding without having other strategic 
aims.
On the basis of this understanding of scientific knowledge, normative elements 
of authorship that contribute to the production of this type of knowledge can be 
extracted. One way of doing this is to start with the functions of authorship for sci-
ence and highlighting the required normative features that result in the production of 
objective scientific knowledge.
Using the Function of Authorship to Move from Objective Science to Ethical 
Authorship
Given the emphasis that Habermas puts on conditions of communication for the 
production of objective scientific knowledge, his theories can guide this article in 
delineating the normative aspects involved in authorship in the natural sciences. To 
practice authorship in accordance with Habermasian ideals implies communicating 
perceptions of natural phenomena to other scientists only with the purpose of vali-
dating conclusions and aimed at improving understanding. That is to say, from the 
perspective of authoring scientists, the aims of communicating results ought to be 
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becoming self-reflective, and improving the scientific community’s understanding of 
nature via genuine discourse.
Yet, these ideals put forward by Habermas expose scientific authorship to a new 
tension. While important normative elements of ethical authorship can be extracted 
from Habermasian theories, they seem rather general (be communicative rather than 
strategic) and may not be immediately practical or realistic. Moreover, highlighting 
self-reflection and initiation of genuine discourse for understating nature, as legiti-
mate conditions of producing objective science, seems to satisfy the interests of one 
of the stakeholders of scientific endeavor (namely science), and the interests of two 
other important stakeholders, namely scientists and scientific institutions, seem to 
remain unaddressed.
From a scientist’s point of view, authorship may have several other functions. As 
argued by sociologists of science, scientists make knowledge available to others in 
exchange for credit (Latour and Woolgar 1986; Bourdieu and Nice 2004). In aca-
demic environments, personal reputation, professional success, and, consequently 
remuneration, are tightly coupled with publication salience and citation (Cronin 
1996). Being an author yields recognition, and scientists who publish more fre-
quently are more likely to succeed in academia (Resnik 2010). Thus, in a very real 
sense, the professional identity of scientists is in large part constituted through the 
way in which they perform as an author. If that is true, the awarded credit and its 
importance for academic life would prevent scientists from being focused only on 
becoming self-reflective or improving understanding through genuine discourse.
Furthermore, in relation to institutional interests, the quantity of publications and 
citations analyses play a crucial role in the evaluation of institutional activities, allo-
cation of funds (Bornmann et  al. 2008), and also universities’ position in modern 
ranking systems (van Raan 2005). Therefore, academic institutions need scientists 
that can publish and attract funding for future research (Resnick 2007). This means 
that having self-reflective scientists who are only involved in discussions leading to 
improving understanding about nature is not necessarily conducive to institutional 
interests.
While career incentives and aspirations for climbing the academic ladder are 
among “forms of positive reinforcement” for scientists (Resnik 2010, p. 68), a one-
sided focus on the eagerness of scientists to receive credits for their contribution to 
the production of objective science in terms of quantifiable performance indicators 
is problematic (Forsberg et  al. 2018). Similarly, given the links between allocated 
funds and quantity of publications, reproaching scientists and scientific institutions 
for having strategic interests seems to ignore the fact that in actual practice, the sci-
entific ecosystem is confronted with an inextricable mix of interests. Evidently, sci-
entific institutions encourage publication so that they can continue to exist and com-
pete with other institutions. A categorical enforcement of norms of good science as 
put by Habermas seems too far removed from actual practice. Rather than strength-
ening integrity robustness, it could demotivate scientists and eventually jeopardize 
the openness of science and hamper allocation of funds to scientific institutions.
Given that Habermas too is not an absolutist and only criticizes the exclu-
sive application of strategic reasoning at the expense of communicative reason 
(Radder 2012), it is safe to assume that in this context, and given the mentioned 
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considerations in terms of scientists’ legitimate interests in publishing and receiving 
credit, a reasonable extent of productivity would not be inconsistent with Haberma-
sian ideals. Quantifiable output measures may be employed as performance indica-
tors, as long as the awareness prevails that the ultimate goal of publishing is genu-
ine communication, in other words as long as the performance indicator does not 
become a goal in itself at the expense of reflection and self-reflection.
From scientists’ and scientific institutions’ points of view, a reasonable exten-
sion of productivity is a state where the right balance between reflectivity and pro-
ductivity regarding their reasons for publication, and also between communicative 
and strategic motivations for communication of their results exists. One way to find 
this balanced state is to place the conditions of objective scientific knowledge on a 
spectrum with productive/strategic and reflective/communicative features at the two 
ends, and introduce the middle of the spectrum as the desired point to aspire in the 
real world. This middle point can be called the state of reasonableness in productiv-
ity and communication of scientific knowledge (see Fig. 3).
One could also formulate this in Aristotelian terms, arguing that ethical (virtu-
ous) authorship is the mean between deficiency (i.e. insufficient emphasis on the 
importance of sharing knowledge through scholarly publications) and excess (i.e. 
publishing merely to boost performance indicators).
Given the critiques that were leveled against the ECCRI’s definition of authorship 
in this paper, identifying a new tension about the state of reasonableness in produc-
tivity and communication is not very difficult. One can correctly argue that similar 
to the notion of ‘significant’ in the context of ‘significant contribution’, ‘reasonable’ 
in the context of ‘reasonableness in productivity and communication’ is open-ended 
and requires further qualification to prevent misunderstanding in international co-
authorships. Thus, although Habermas helps this article in identifying the basis and 
contours of ethical authorship in the natural sciences, using his theories contributes 
to a new practical tension. Namely, yet another open-ended statement (i.e. reasona-
bleness in productivity and communication) is being used to explain what is it to 
be an ethical author. In terms of (Aristotelian) virtue ethics: the difference between 
reasonable and unreasonable, between sufficient, insufficient and excessive, cannot 
be defined exactly (in quantitative terms) but is rather a matter of attitude and ethos, 
which is missing here.
One way to address this problem is to turn to other sources that, while shar-
ing a core fundamental basis with Habermasian theories, are more pragmatic in 
dealing with issues that are linked with personal and institutional gains from pub-
lications. Given the tight links of authorship with the reward system of science 









Fig. 3  State of reasonableness in the communication of scientific knowledge
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science on its reward system seem to be helpful in articulating what is meant by 
reasonableness in productivity and communication of scientific knowledge.
To be more precise, one way to clarify the notion of reasonableness in this 
context is to admit the dependence of science on its reward system without con-
sidering it entirely problematic. As explained earlier, since the gained credit 
encourages scientists to discover nature and communicate their results, expecting 
authors to solely publish for the sake of improving science without thinking about 
their personal interests is not realistic. To that end using the notion of ‘ethos of 
science’ developed by the American sociologist Robert King Merton will be ben-
eficial. The ethos of science entails values that can help in providing a defini-
tion of an ethical author by painting the picture of a scientist who is “detached, 
methodical and committed to the search for the truth rather than personal glori-
fication” (Macfarlane and Cheng 2008, p. 69). These values will be explained in 
more detail below.
Mertonian Values, Corrective to Habermasian Ideals and Familiar for Scientists
In what follows, a short introduction on Mertonian ethos will be followed by more 
specific justifications for their usefulness in the current context. As will be dis-
cussed in detail, the ethos of science fine-tunes Habermasian ideals and improves 
the normative framework that was developed in the previous section.
In 1943, Robert Merton presented four values of scientific research, including 
Communism, Universalism, Disinterestedness and Organized Skepticism, also 
known through the acronym CUDOS.
Communism Merton considers science as a cultural heritage that belongs to the 
community and public domain and invites scientists to acknowledge the effect that 
formerly discovered knowledge has had on their current progress (Merton 1973).
Universalism Deeply rooted in the impersonal character of science, universal-
ism in science suggests that acceptance or rejection of scientific claims should 
never be dependent on the race, nationality, religion, class or other social and per-
sonal qualities of the author and all such qualities are irrelevant (Merton 1973).
Disinterestedness As a basic institutional element, the demand for disinterest-
edness has a firm basis in the public and testable character of science and contrib-
utes to the integrity of researchers. It epitomizes respect for peers, science and 
society, and manifests scientists’ accountability (Merton 1973).
Organized skepticism Interrelated with all the three aforementioned values, 
skepticism and scrutiny of beliefs are considered as a methodological as well 
as an institutional mandate. Merton postulates a relationship between organized 
skepticism and the other three ethos, and implicitly assigns a supervisory role to 
it (Merton 1973).
In addition to their advantages for describing the desired values of scientific 
research, for the following reasons, Mertonian ‘ethos of science’ are beneficial 
within the context and corrective to the normative spectrum that was created 
using Habermasian ideals:
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1. Complying with the fundamental assumptions made by Habermas: Merton asserts 
that unlike technical methodologies that are a matter of expediency due to rational 
reasons, the ethos of science is binding because it is believed to be right and good 
(Merton 1973). This clearly overlaps with the Habermasian fundamental assump-
tion that scientists need to follow certain norms (e.g. willingness to communicate) 
because otherwise subjective or strategic features may contaminate the knowledge 
produced.
2. Corrective to Habermasian ideals: Merton recognizes the reward system as a 
necessary feature of the conduct of science and believes that it prevents science 
from sinking into anonymity, and “reinforces and perpetuates the institutional 
emphasis upon originality” (Merton 1973, p. 302). Thus, using ethos of science 
responds well to the shortcomings of the Habermasian normative framework by 
admitting that science, scientists and scientific institutions are dependent on a 
reward system, and hence it is not problematic per se that prolific productivity 
tends to be beneficial in science.
3. Relevant to the current practice of science: In practice, if correctly understood, 
Mertonian values “remain at the heart of the production of reliable knowledge” 
(Cottey 2016, p. 369). Despite being originally suggested decades ago, Mertonian 
values are still highly popular among modern scientists. In fact, scientists in dif-
ferent disciplines and levels of seniority feel to a great extent that those values 
“should represent the behavior of scientists” (Anderson et al. 2010, p. 385).
4. Useful for international contexts: Particularly useful for the current context and 
communication of the norms of ethical authorship in the natural sciences to inter-
national co-authors, is that like other general concepts, Mertonian values possess 
a nonlocal meaning, and hence, they can be applied in various new situations 
(Radder 2010). Given the fluidity of the concept of authorship, notably, because 
its meaning differs per period and discourse (Foucault 1979; Zwart 2001, 2005), 
this nonlocality of Mertonian values will strengthen the suggested concept in 
dealing with the disciplinary contingencies and international norms in a meaning-
ful manner.
Thus, Mertonian values are well equipped to fine-tune the normative elements 
that were extracted from Habermasian theories. To create the hybrid between Mer-
ton and Habermas (the so-called ethos of reasonableness in authorship) the bound-
aries of ‘reasonableness in productivity and communication’ will be limited with 
Mertonian values. That yields a normative continuum with a green zone in the mid-
dle that represents reasonableness in productivity and communication (the “mean” 
of virtue ethics). This article argues that this green area entails the essence of what it 
is to be an ethical author in the natural sciences (Fig. 4).
Now that some normative elements suitable for the definition of authorship in 
the natural sciences are identified, the next challenge is to suggest methods for the 
communication of these to international co-authors. As mentioned earlier, one way 
of communicating these definitions at the moment is via COCs such as the ECCRI, 
but given the challenges of communicating norms of authorship to international co-
authors, a new approach in formulating and communicating these normative ele-
ments will be suggested.
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Communicating the Ethos of Reasonableness in the Authorship 
of Natural Sciences
In the last section, a hybrid solution was used that was a combination of theo-
ries developed by Habermas and Merton. It was concluded that in the natural sci-
ences, scientists must publish the results of their observations, experiments, and 
analyses with the aim of becoming self-reflective and improving the understand-
ing of the scientific community, without exclusively thinking about their own 
interests, through adhering to the ethos of science as put forward by Merton.
The next challenge is to find effective methods for communicating these 
abstract normative elements to international co-authors in a way that is sensitive 
to differences in terms of research cultures and conventions between disciplines 
and global regions. Given the challenges of providing descriptive prescriptions 
that are useful in daily practice, this article suggests the use of relevant meta-
phors as an effective way of explaining the ethos of reasonableness in the com-
munication of scientific knowledge. To further understand the role that metaphors 
can play in the communication of norms of authorship, the following two sec-














1. Published with the aim 
of becoming self-reflective, 
but did not appreciate the 
importance of gained 
credit for reputation and 
career development.
1. Published merely to 
boost performance 
indicators and increase 
the quantity of 
publications.
2. Did not involve 
genuine discourse and 
was not aimed to improve 
the understanding of 
peers. Was strategically 
aimed to satisfy personal 
interests.
2. Involved genuine 
discourse and was merely 
motivated to improve the 
understanding of peers 
without having any other 
interest (e.g. recognition).
Fig. 4  The ethos of reasonableness in the communication of scientific knowledge
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The Power of Metaphor
This section will stress the usefulness of metaphors in explaining the norms of 
ethical authorship of the natural sciences to international co-authors, and sug-
gests that using metaphors in parallel with descriptive prescriptions of the COCs 
is likely to improve the understanding of international co-authors about these 
norms.
It is argued that metaphors can be used as interpretive conceptual resources 
that allow one to understand the logic and entailments of concepts (Johnson 
2008). Hence, using them in addition to the current definition of authorship could 
be helpful in the prevention of confusion and misunderstanding among interna-
tional co-authors. The importance of “metaphor as a methodological resource 
is in its capacity to render and connect knowledge” with the lived experiences 
(Black 2013, p. 26). The imagination involved in using metaphors reaches deep 
into “the hard stuff of the world of physical and social experience and seizes upon 
possible new relations for thought and action” (Fesmire 2003, p. 66).
Furthermore, since the perceptions and inferences that follow from the use of 
metaphors are believed to benefit actors in both understanding and making the 
appropriate action (Lakoff and Johnson 2003), using them in COCs does not seem 
inconsistent with the envisaged role of these documents. In fact, several empiri-
cal studies have highlighted the positive effects of using metaphors. For instance, 
15 years after Mark Johnson’s claims regarding the historical uses of metaphor 
in improving human moral understanding and advantages in explaining ethical 
concepts (Johnson 1993), empirical research in brain science and neural compu-
tation attested to positive influences of metaphor on basic operation of abstract 
thinking (Johnson 2008) and processing of abstract concepts (Lakoff 2008). More 
importantly, the possibility of creating universal metaphors that do not use cul-
tural information and hence, are not culture-specific (Lakoff and Johnson 2003) 
is arguably the most unique advantage of using metaphors to communicate the 
norms of ethical authorship to international co-authors.
This article recommends that the notion of ethos of reasonableness in the com-
munication of scientific knowledge provides the necessary conceptual substance 
to what needs to be defined as ethical authorship, and with the help of metaphors, 
this concept becomes more accessible to international co-authors. That said, due 
to the disciplinary differences in what constitutes a reasonable degree of produc-
tivity and a balance between reflective and productive reasoning for publications, 
field-experts and supervisors are best placed to develop and/or revise relevant 
metaphors based on what ethical authorship means in their discipline. This could 
be based on the disciplinary differences in relation to units of publications. Best 
articulated by the English physicist and historian of science Derek J. de Solla 
Price, expected productivity varies in different disciplines. For instance, while 
some branches of biochemistry can produce a separable and valid publication in 
a few weeks, some parts of astrophysics require 2 or 3 years of work before they 
can publish a valid unit (Price 1981). Thus, it is reasonable to argue that only 
field-experts and supervisors who are interested in promoting ethical authorship, 
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could help in articulation and translation of the state of reasonableness in the 
communication of scientific knowledge within their disciplines.
Challenges of Using Metaphors
It is worth mentioning that despite the aforementioned considerations in the useful-
ness of metaphors, using them in explaining moral issues is also criticized. Two of 
the more relevant critiques in this context will be mentioned here. Firstly, due to 
their poetic and rhetorical nature, they are believed to have no rational or conceptual 
content and merely represent an “emotional expression of approval or disapproval 
for certain acts or states of character” (Johnson 1993, p. 34). Secondly, metaphors 
are believed to be cognitively indeterminate, contributing to ambiguity and multiva-
lence, hence, making it harder to find the right action for a given situation (Johnson 
1993). In what follows, measures that were taken in this article to safeguard its rec-
ommendation against both lines of critique are explained.
In response to the first critique, since the main suggestion of this article is based 
on a reasonably solid normative framework, and uses metaphors to further explain 
the extracted normative concept (i.e. ethos of reasonableness in the authorship of 
natural sciences), developed metaphors will not be irrational or non-conceptual. 
Regarding the second critique, given that this article suggests using metaphors that 
are developed by field-experts and in addition to descriptive definitions, metaphors 
aimed at explaining the suggested concept of ethical authorship are likely to trigger 
similar moral values for co-authors independent of their nationality or culture. Thus, 
with the use of metaphors that allow scientists to infer similar normative values, pre-
scriptions are less likely to be misinterpreted in a multinational environment.
The next section will introduce a metaphor that can better explain the notion of 
ethical authorship in the natural sciences based on the normative framework that 
was suggested in this article.
An Example of a Metaphor to Explain Ethical Authorship in Natural Sciences
This example is inspired by the way in which Habermas explains the role of commu-
nication in understanding nature. In describing the normative aspects of the commu-
nication of claims in natural sciences, Habermas notes that through communicated 
claims, readers understand a symbolic pre-structured representation of reality, and 
attempt to take the same position the scientist(s) adopted in describing their percep-
tion of nature. Once the observer shares an observation, the interpreter experiences 
a communication: a symbolically established relationship with the observer. While 
both observer and interpreter are related to sectors of reality, the first has an immedi-
ate experience and the latter a mediated experience (Habermas 1971).
The idea that the observer has an immediate access to observable events while 
interpreters have a mediated access suggests that in empirical-analytic natural sci-
ences where scientists express the details of one of their analyses/experiments about 
the natural world, communication of claims with other scientists can be seen as 
a metaphoric testimony in a court about a witnessed event. In this metaphor, the 
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communication addresses an event that happened in the natural world, and the 
scientist(s) who observed the natural event are metaphorically acting like a volun-
tary witness.2 Consequently, the scientific community will act like a jury that will 
also listen to other witnesses, acquire relevant expertise (from reviewers), and make 
a decision about these claims (see Table 1). This article argues that in communicat-
ing the natural sciences, an ethical author should act like a voluntary witness. Even 
though the use of witnesses in judicial systems varies worldwide, which might affect 
how this metaphor is understood, a slightly fine-tuned version of this metaphor 
might work in an international community, because it primarily emphasizes the pro-
cess of witnessing and testifying. Using the metaphoric voluntary witness who has 
observed an event and testifies about its details in a court is a useful way of explain-
ing the ethos of reasonableness in the communication of scientific knowledge.
In relation to complying with the suggested framework, the voluntary witness sat-
isfies the requirements of ethos of reasonableness:
As this article argued, from the perspective of ethical authors, the aims of author-
ship of results in the natural sciences ought to be (a) becoming self-reflective, and 
(b) improving the scientific community’s understanding of nature via a genuine dis-
course. Therefore, a good voluntary witness in this metaphor needs to fulfill both of 
those conditions too. Since a voluntary witness is under no obligation to testify, it is 
safe to assume that she is genuinely interested in communicating observations. Fur-
thermore, given that in most cases there are also other witnesses (whether voluntary 
or not) who could have seen the same event from a different perspective, or with 
dissimilar means (e.g. color vision deficiency affects how one sees colors), the mere 
presence of a voluntary witness in the hearing suggests that one is there to have her 
observations confirmed and recognized. Through having one’s testimony compared 
with testimonies provided by other witnesses, one will contribute to a genuine dis-
course, and finally, once judged by a competent jury, one will become aware of the 
flaws/misinterpretations in one’s own testimony.
Also, in relation to the Mertonian ethos of science, the metaphoric voluntary 
witness remains relevant and meets the requirements of the normative framework. 
Regarding universalism, a good witness’ claims are not dependent on personal cri-
teria such as race, nationality or religion. One can be a witness as long as the person 
involved is capable of knowing, and shows that she has indeed carefully observed 
Table 1  Stakeholders in scientific authorship and their role in the suggested metaphor
Scientific authorship in the natural sciences Voluntary witness as a metaphor
Authoring scientist(s) Witness(es)
Experiments/analyses An observable event
Doing the experiments/analyzing Witnessing
Scientific community A jury of peers
Authorship in the natural sciences Testifying
2 A witness willing to testify in court without the need for a subpoena compelling the witness to appear. 
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the event about which she testifies. Communism would imply that the testimony 
belongs to the public domain and the jury, lawyers, prosecutors, or other witnesses 
are free to use the testimony that was provided by the voluntary witness as long as 
they mention the source. The focus is on sharing and transparency, rather than on 
secrecy. A good voluntary witness is also likely to be disinterested in what the ruling 
will be, and although interested in the topic and eager to have her observations and 
points of view recognized, ideally, she would not favor a side in the court. Organized 
skepticism would imply having a skeptical attitude towards what is being discussed. 
Good voluntary witnesses would not accept what they hear on its face value and will 
be critical about the provided facts and arguments by other witnesses.
In explaining the concept of ethical authorship, using the notion of a good vol-
untary witness and asking scientists to consider this as a model addresses several 
challenges involved in international collaborations. Perhaps highlighting a crucial 
similarity between authorship and witnessing explains this more clearly. Although 
at first glance authorship may seem a clear concept, on further inspection multiple 
ambiguities arise, as we have seen, due for instance to cultural and conventional dif-
ferences of authorship between cultures or research fields (e.g. different answers to 
questions such as: who should count as an author, what are the responsibilities of an 
author, etc.). The witness concept is similar to authorship in this sense. Although it 
may initially seem straightforward, the precise meaning of the concept, as well as 
the obligations involved, may differ depending on the context. For instance, because 
witnesses play different roles in inquisitorial compared to adversarial systems, they 
might have dissimilar obligations. The term ‘witness’ may have a specific mean-
ing (witnessing a concrete event) but also a more general meaning (we are all ‘wit-
nesses’ of what is happening in the world today), and this can be discerned in author-
ship as well, for authors can be authors of specific publications, but also authors in 
a more general sense (professionals who make a living from academic writing and 
contribute to academic discourse). Still, this article argues that in being a witness (as 
well as in being an author) a number of quintessential values are involved, such as, 
for instance, trustworthiness and impartiality, even if the precise role and function 
of witnesses (or authors) may differ in various contexts and traditions. That said, 
because the witness is a familiar concept, it is more likely to trigger similar moral 
values. Thus, it is safe to assume that by asking the question ‘how does a good vol-
untary witness act?’, ‘with honesty’, ‘objectively’ or ‘neutrally’ will be among the 
first mentioned qualities. Furthermore, due to its legal implications and use, a wit-
ness is likely to come across as an important function, which comes with certain 
responsibilities, one of which entails ‘respect’ for the subject of inquiry and those 
involved. A witness is valued for her observations as a ‘reliable’ participant and can 
be held ‘accountable’ if necessary.
In terms of the limitations of this metaphor, depending on the context one can 
think of factors that restrict its applicability. For instance, in countries where the 
public trust in the legal system is rather low, or countries where the adversarial 
legal system is used, the role of witness might be interpreted slightly differently, 
and hence, this metaphor might not be as useful as other places. Furthermore, a wit-
ness (no matter how well-intended or voluntary) might misremember facts, causing 
the testimony to become inaccurate, and an opportunistic person might try using 
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this as an excuse for justifying dishonest reporting. It should also be clear that this 
metaphor is not going to benefit disciplines that do not require direct observations or 
empirical research.
Conclusion
Given the rapid growth of international co-authorships, this article provides sugges-
tions to improve the comprehensibility of current definitions of authorship for inter-
national co-authors. Via laying out the dynamics of modern authorship practices and 
analyzing the definition of authorship provided in the ECCRI, it was argued that this 
definition could be misinterpreted and misunderstood. Hence, enriching the current 
definition using normative elements that are specific to the practice of authorship 
was suggested. Due to the rapid growth of international co-authorships in the natural 
sciences, this branch of science was used as an example to create a framework for 
extracting the normative elements involved in the authorship of claims about nature.
Using theory of communication and human interests in science developed by 
Habermas and Mertonian ethos of science, it was argued that scientists would ide-
ally use publication as a means for facilitating understanding and validation of their 
results. In doing that, furthering scientific careers and benefitting from the fruits of 
scientific publications through gained credit is not necessarily unethical as long as 
scientists adhere to the ethos of science. Finally, it was suggested that using meta-
phorical statements that were developed by field-experts and supervisors on the 
basis of the suggested framework, provides a platform for communication of norms 
of authorship and their importance within international project groups.
Without empirical research to determine the effectiveness of using metaphors, no 
one can claim with certainty that by using metaphors misunderstanding of norms 
will be completely prevented. What this article claims is that given the normative 
aspects that are involved in determining authorship in the natural sciences, using 
metaphors makes these norms less likely to be misinterpreted, and hence, in combi-
nation with current definitions, informs scientists about the ideals that are necessary 
for ethical authorship. In addition to improving the comprehensibility of open-ended 
definitions for international groups, using metaphors extends the reach of COCs, and 
provides space for conversation and self-reflection. A metaphor becomes the mem-
ory, the kind of educational takeaway message that scientists need to carry in order 
to deal with the moral question of future circumstances.
Therefore, in addition to the current definition of authorship provided by ECCRI:
All authors agree on the sequence of authorship, acknowledging that author-
ship itself is based on a significant contribution to the design of the research, 
relevant data collection, or the analysis or interpretation of the results (ALLEA 
2017, p. 7);
this article suggests considering the inclusion of the concept of ethical author-
ship and describing the state of reasonableness in the communication of scientific 
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knowledge and noting the usefulness of metaphors in explaining this state. One pro-
posal to consider and use in the ECCRI could be:
Ethical Authorship refers to authors’ motivations for publications, the best of 
which entails using publications for validating methodology and results, and 
improving the understanding of the scientific community regarding the dis-
cussed issue. Using metaphors or other creative methods, supervisors and 
field-experts explain the concept of Ethical Authorship to their colleagues. 
One useful metaphor to explain what ethical authorship means in natural sci-
ences, is to encourage authors to behave like a voluntary witness who wit-
nessed an event in nature, and aims to testify about its details to the scientific 
community.
Conducting empirical research among co-authors of different nationality/disci-
pline to determine the success rates of using different metaphors in improving the 
comprehensibility of authorship definitions could be among useful topics for future 
research.
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